The Kremlin’s commitment problem

Dear all,

These days each of us is doing her/his best to raise awareness and call for action to stop Russia’s invasion. Yesterday, I had a chance to participate in the online event “Ukraine, Russia, East Asia” hosted by Temple University in Japan. I thought I would share my points with our group.

What can force the Kremlin to stop its war?

On 24 February 2022 Putin openly invaded Ukraine. The extent of the Kremlin’s violations of the international laws and the UN Statute had been so severe that Ukraine has already filed its evidence-based application to institute proceedings against Russia in the International Court of Justice – the judicial organ of the United Nations.

Before 24 February 2022, it was clear that Russia’s declared objectives of the full-fledged military invasion in Ukraine were flawed. There was no evidence that Ukraine was about to join NATO. The Kremlin had already been a de facto patron of the self-declared DNR & LNR, whom it had officially recognised as independent states on the eve of the invasion in Ukraine. Those territories have not been under the control of the Ukrainian government since April-May 2014.  

The chosen military tools are irrelevant to fulfilling Russia’s declared political objective – to change Ukraine’s foreign and internal policy priorities. Ukraine’s policy priorities usually change as a result of elections. There were numerous instances when that happened for the benefit of Russia’s foreign policy: the victory of the Orange revolution in 2004 was followed by the victory of opposition with a pro-Russian manifesto at the 2006 parliamentary elections, and its leader briefly served as a prime minister, then as a president (February 2010 – February 2014). Because Russia violated Ukraine’s territorial integrity in 2014, voters in the annexed Crimea and the non-government controlled territories of Donbas did not cast their ballot at the subsequent elections in Ukraine, and other voters’ pro-Russian preferences heavily declined.

Because both the (declared) objectives and the military tools were flawed, Russia’s threats to invade Ukraine were been interpreted as Putin’s blackmailing. After the Kremlin started the full-scale military invasion in Ukraine, there is more and more evidence that he is trying to literally ruin Ukraine (the scope of civilian casualties due to missile strikes and bombs; the use of weapons that are prohibited by the Geneva Convention) and blackmailing the rest of the world (on 27 February 2022, Putin ordered to place the deterrence forces, which include nuclear weapons on "a special mode of combat duty").

When the Kremlin annexed Crimea and fuelled the armed conflict in Donbas approximately eight years ago, it obtained the experience that no one could alter its behavior. Right now, the Kremlin is under severe and increasing pressure, it obtains absolutely different experience, and there might be a chance to force it to change its course of action.

The military forces of Ukraine have been performing their duty beyond anyone’s expectations. The Russian army has lost more people since the start of its invasion into Ukraine than during two wars in Chechnya. Ambitious international sanctions have been imposed strikingly quickly. Russia’s key policymakers, Russia’s central bank, and Russia’s export of natural resources are under sanctions imposed by those who used to be Russia’s partners at the international arena for long.

There is evidence that the consolidation of Russia’s domestic elites has been undermined. Local deputies signed their open statement that disapproved of the war against Ukraine even before the sanctions were imposed. One of the major Russian oligarchs (“Alfa-Group”) Mikhail Fridman stated he was against the war soon after the sanctions were introduced. So far, there have been fewer soft-liners than hard-liners among domestic elites.

The imposed economic sanctions have quickly become pricy for the civilian people in Russia, and public consent is cracking. The number of public protests and the number of those who join have been rapidly growing. The domestic military and security services still block them and punish them, but then new ones burst out throughout the country.

The bilateral negotiations between the aggressor and the defender started on 28 February 2022. Because it is unlikely that the bilateral negotiations would be sufficient in these circumstances, the emergency special session of the UN General Assembly on Ukraine was held on 28 February 2022. The Kremlin has not de-escalated. The negotiation process goes on simultaneously with the ongoing war against Ukraine and the investigation in the International Court of Justice based on the evidence provided by Ukraine.

The expected immediate outcome is to force the Kremlin to stop the war, pay the price, and prevent it from happening again. If we use the terms of rationalist theories, one of the major issues seems to be the commitment problem. Previous experience proves that promises that the Kremlin gives can be easily broken. First and foremost, this is proved by its via lotion of the Security Assurances according to the Budapest Memorandum in 1994, and it does not really matter that the document was vague or poorly designed. Most recently, the Kremlin’s officials have promised the whole international community not to invade Ukraine.  

What can be the reliable proof that the Kremlin would credibly commit to fulfilling any (potential) promises to Ukraine and to the international community? This is the priority issue for the UN’s agenda at the moment.